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Available online 20 August 2008We analyze the effects of changes in dividend tax policy using a life-cycle model of the ﬁrm, in
which new ﬁrms ﬁrst access equitymarkets, then grow internally, and ﬁnally pay dividendswhen
they have reached steady state. We ﬁnd that unanticipated permanent changes in tax rates have
only small effects on aggregate investment, since macroeconomic dynamics are dominated by
mature ﬁrms for which dividend taxation is not distortionary. Anticipated or temporary dividend
taxchanges, on theotherhand, create incentives forﬁrms to engage in inter-temporal tax arbitrage
so as to reduce investors' tax burden. For example, a temporary tax cut – the typemost likely to be
enacted by policymakers – induces ﬁrms to accelerate dividend payments while tax rates are low,
which reduces their cash holdings and makes them capital-constrained when large investment
opportunities arise. This can signiﬁcantly lower aggregate investment for periods after the tax cut.








Political economy of taxation1. Introduction
The economic effects of dividend taxation have been at the center of a ﬁerce academic debate for decades. Proponents of the
‘traditional view’ of dividend taxation (as discussed e.g. in Poterba and Summers, 1985) stress that it raises the cost of equity
ﬁnance. Hence, they argue, it distorts ﬁrms' investment decisions, and higher dividend taxes decrease the long-run capital
intensity of an economy. The ‘new’ or ‘tax capitalization view,’ by contrast, which was developed in King (1977) and Auerbach
(1979), extending an earlier argument of Stiglitz (1973),3 assumes that ﬁrms use retained earnings as the marginal source of
ﬁnance; the level of dividend taxation is thus irrelevant for their investment decisions.
In this paper, we explicitly take this controversy into account by modeling the life cycle of ﬁrms. Following the discussion in
Stiglitz (1973, 1976) and Sinn (1991), ﬁrms in our model go through three stages: When they are started, their marginal source ofefﬁcient to distribute funds to shareholders by buying back shares than by paying dividends, with effective
x rate. The fact that so much money is nonetheless distributed through dividends has subsequently come to
ssume that all payouts from the ﬁrm are subject to the dividend tax, as if there were no stock repurchases.
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143A. Korinek, J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Public Economics 93 (2009) 142–159ﬁnance is equitymarkets. As predicted by the traditional view, dividend taxation is distortionary for such ﬁrms. In the second stage,
ﬁrms grow internally by retaining all their earnings until they reach their optimal size. In the ﬁnal stage, or steady state, they pay
out their earnings in the form of dividends.
In Sinn (1991), the only way for ﬁrms to carry resources from one period to the next is by ﬁrst investing into physical capital,
which exhibits strictly decreasing returns, and then liquidating the investment the following period. This severely limits ﬁrms'
ability to engage in intertemporal tax arbitrage. By contrast, our paper emphasizes that ﬁrms routinely hold cash or cash
equivalents to carry resources into the future, without being subject to the decreasing returns exhibited by physical capital. This
enables them to arbitrage between different tax regimes, with important efﬁciency implications.
In our model, ﬁrms' steady state cash holdings are determined as a tradeoff between two considerations, imperfect access to
capital markets and agency costs of holding cash: We capture the ﬁrst consideration by assuming that investment opportunities
arrive randomly, yet that ﬁrms cannot raise new funds in capital markets instantaneously; they need to carry cash on their balance
sheets in order to take advantage of investment opportunities. The second consideration is that agency problems induce investors
to discount future dividend ﬂows from ﬁrms at a higher rate than the returns of cash on hand. This is consistent with awide variety
of models of agency concerns; a speciﬁc example based onmanagerial myopia is given in the Appendix A. A ﬁrm's equilibrium level
of cash balances trades off the expected beneﬁt of holding cash for investment against the cost of holding cash balances; this
implies that ﬁrms are capital constrained in equilibrium.
As postulated by the traditional view of dividend taxation, we show that dividend taxation is distortionary for young ﬁrms that
issue new equity.4 Let us capture the logic of this in the simplest possible model, where i represents the amount invested, r is
investors' required return and τ the dividend tax rate. We can then deﬁne a ﬁrm's optimum amount of investment as the point





model i1þ r ¼ 1 − τð Þf 0 ið Þ:
e higher the tax rate, the lower the return of ﬁrm investment to the shareholder; therefore the higher the required marginalTh
gross product of capital and the lower investment.
On the other hand, an internally growing or mature ﬁrm that ﬁnances investment out of its cash reserves has to reduce its
dividend in the current period, which entails a marginal cost to shareholders of (1−τ)(1+ r), and can distribute the return of the
investment net of taxes next period. The resulting equilibrium condition is1 − τð Þ 1þ rð Þ ¼ 1 − τð Þf 0 ið Þ:
e tax rate cancels out of ﬁrms' optimality condition; a constant level of dividend taxation therefore does not affect theTh
investment decisions of internally growing or mature ﬁrms that do not access equity markets. Since these two categories of ﬁrms
dominate aggregate investment, the effect of the level of dividend taxation on investment is low at a macroeconomic level. By the
same logic, the impact of unanticipated permanent tax changes on macroeconomic variables is generally small, since they affect
only young ﬁrms that raise new equity.
By contrast, anticipated tax changes have macroeconomic effects that can be an order of magnitude higher: they allow mature
ﬁrms to engage in inter-temporal tax arbitrage by shifting dividend payments from high-tax periods to low-tax periods. This
involves signiﬁcant deviations from ﬁrms' optimal steady state cash holdings, and since ﬁrms are capital constrained, changes in
their cash holdings can signiﬁcantly distort aggregate investment and output.
An anticipated dividend tax cut allows ﬁrms to reduce investors' tax bill by postponing dividend payments to the period in
which the tax cut takes place. This implies that ﬁrms carry larger cash balances in themeantime, which allows them tomake larger
investments when an investment opportunity arrives.
By the same token, an anticipated dividend tax increase creates an incentive for ﬁrms to accelerate their dividend payments, i.e.
to take advantage of the low tax rate while it lasts by paying out a special dividend before the increase takes place. This leads to
lower cash balances and in turn lower investment in the following periods. Using the simpliﬁed notation from above, an increase in
the tax rate from τL to τH implies that paying out dividends becomes comparatively cheaper than investing and distributing the
payoff under a higher tax rate. The equilibrium level of investment i is then given by1 − τLð Þ 1þ rð Þ ¼ 1 − τHð Þf 0 ið Þ:When dividend taxes are expected to change, the tax terms no longer cancel; instead we can show that the required return for an
investment is higher and the ﬁrm will invest less:5f 0 ið Þ ¼ 1þ rð Þ 1 − τL
1 − τH
N1þ r:
licitly, much of the literature on corporate taxation and investment has assumed the existence of capital constraints; for in the absence of such
ints, ﬁrms could always ﬁnance their investment at the margin by debt; with interest payments tax deductible, there would be no marginal distortion. See
(1973, 1976). As we note later, our analysis is consistent with partial debt ﬁnancing.
e that for simplicity, this simple two-period example of a tax increase abstracts from the difference between a ﬁrm's cash holdings and physical capital –
of the existing literature does. For tax cuts, a thorough analysis necessitates that cash holdings are explicitly taken into account, as we do in the full
n Section 2.
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opposite direction. As we argued, the arbitrage effects of the anticipated reversal are likely to far outweigh any efﬁciency effects of
the ﬁrst unanticipated change. A temporary dividend tax cut, for example, is thus likely to have an overall negative impact on
aggregate investment and output. Similarly, uncertainty about an impending dividend tax increase can lead ﬁrms to reduce their
cash holdings, with the corresponding negative macroeconomic effects.
We also discuss the political economy implications of dividend taxation in a contestable democracy with two parties,
conservatives and social democrats, that have different preferences regarding dividend taxation and adjust the tax rate accordingly
when they come to power. Paradoxically, aggregate investment is higher under social democratic rule, since ﬁrms expect a tax cut
when that party loses power and hold higher cash reserves in anticipation. Under a conservative regime, the opposite conclusions
hold.
Aside fromproviding new insights into the consequences of the temporary dividend tax cuts that were introduced in the United
States in 2003 and extended in 2006, this paper also makes a point about the political economy of government policies of more
general import: in contestable democracies, the effects of policies have to be analyzed in the context of an environment in which
economic agents expect (stochastically) a change in decision makers and in government policies. It is wrong simply to assume, as
much of the political economy literature has done heretofore, that government policies can be altered permanently. Political
turnover and the resulting policy instability affect the behavior of economic agents, and rational decision makers have to take this
into account in formulating their policies.
1.1. US dividend tax policy in the current decade
In analyzing the implications of dividend tax policy on ﬁrm behavior and the macro-economy, it is important to take account of
both implemented tax changes and expectations thereof. In the United States dividends used to be taxed at the personal income tax
rate of up to 38.6% in the late 1990s. In his campaign for the 2000 presidential election, George W. Bush ran on a broad platform of
lowering taxes so as to reduce the high predicted ﬁscal surplus over the coming decade. As a result, rational, forward-looking ﬁrms
must have assigned a positive probability to a cut in dividend taxes. Indeed, in May 2003, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) reduced the maximum personal income tax rate on corporate dividends to 15%, with an expiration
date of 2008.
While many conservatives argued that this tax cut should be made permanent, an increasing number of critics called for an
early repeal, especially after the anticipated ﬁscal surplus quickly disappeared and the country was confronted with large ﬁscal
deﬁcits. The critics included Senator Kerry who ran against President Bush in the 2004 presidential elections. During the election
campaigns of 2004, ﬁrms must thus have assigned a positive probability to all three events – the scheduled expiration of the tax
cuts in 2008 as well as an extension or an early repeal. This latter possibility made it optimal to pay out large dividends in 2004, as
exempliﬁed by a $32 bn special dividend by Microsoft.
When Bushwon re-election in 2004, expectations adjusted again: an early repeal of the tax cut no longer seemed likely. Instead,
a special budget reconciliation bill in May 2006 extended the dividend tax cuts to the end of 2010. At least partly as a result of these
policies, the fraction of dividends in national income jumped from 4.4% in 2003 to 6.5% in 2007 — a level not seen since 1930.6
In 2008, the Republican presidential candidate Senator McCain called for making the 2003 dividend tax cut permanent, where
“permanent” has to be understood in the context of a political economy in which future governments are likely to change course
again, as we discuss in Section 5. By contrast, the Democratic candidate Senator Obama advocated a repeal of the cut. Again, ﬁrms
were faced with the fundamental uncertainty that is inherent in every public policy and that is the topic of our paper.
1.2. The academic debate on dividend taxation
A number of researchers have empirically investigated the impact of the 2003 dividend tax cut on ﬁrms' payout behavior. There
is evidence that the tax cut has led to a signiﬁcant increase in both special and regular dividend payouts (see e.g. Blouin et al., 2004;
Chetty and Saez, 2005), consistent with our view that the policy change induced ﬁrms to engage in intertemporal tax arbitrage.7
Chetty and Saez (2005) and Brown et al. (2007) also document that ﬁrm responses to the dividend tax cut differed depending
on the speciﬁc incentives faced by executives and shareholders. For example, ﬁrms with large inside ownership or a large and
inﬂuential outside shareholder that is subject to dividend taxation were more likely to raise dividends in response to the tax cut.
While our model describes the behavior of representative ﬁrms, our basic insights would be unaffected if we account for this form
of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Amromin et al. (2007) and Auerbach and Hassett (2006, 2007) ﬁnd that the 2003 tax cut also had a signiﬁcantly positive effect
on the share prices of high dividend-paying stocks, which suggests that their marginal cost of equity ﬁnance was reduced. In6 Data from the webpage of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, http://www.bea.gov, Table 1.12.
7 It is also likely that part of the observed increase in dividends was due to cyclical and secular increases in ﬁrm proﬁts and due to substitution between share
repurchases and dividends, as suggested e.g. by Brown et al. (2007). However, according to Chetty and Saez (2006), the existing data is not yet sufﬁcient to
provide a deﬁnite answer to this question. In our analysis, the distinction between regular and special dividends is immaterial: just as tax policies are never
“permanent,” so are ﬁrms' payout policies: for signaling or intertemporal smoothing reasons ﬁrms might prefer to gradually lower their cash balances for the
duration of the low dividend tax rate by raising regular dividends. Also, they might rationally anticipate that a future tax increase could allow them to cut regular
dividends with only small adverse signaling effects.
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aggregate investment.
Our paper argues that this view is incomplete, if not incorrect. Indeed, theremay be little relationship between share prices and
investment. We discussed earlier (and show more rigorously below) that temporary dividend tax reductions can be associated
with an increase in share prices but a lowering of investment.
Someof the proponents of the dividend tax cut have also argued that certainﬁrmswith large cash holdings engage in sociallywasteful
investments so that their net marginal return to investment is actually negative.8 If such ﬁrms are encouraged to pay out dividends,
economic efﬁciency could be increased for two potential reasons: ﬁrst, cash-abundant ﬁrmswould no longer engage in asmuchwasteful
investment; secondly, their cash distributions could get reshufﬂed to cash-constrained ﬁrms with a higher marginal product of capital.
The ﬁrst reason, that there was over-investment and that it would have been a good thing for investment to be reduced in some
ﬁrms, runs at least counter to the professed argument for the 2003 temporary dividend tax cut, which was introduced to stimulate
the economy in the belief that aggregate investment was too low at the time. There may have been some ﬁrms, where agency
problems were so severe that managers made inefﬁcient investments at the margin9 and for which a temporary reduction in
dividend taxes that reduced investment may have been welfare increasing. However, at least the average product of capital inside
ﬁrms seems to be signiﬁcantly larger than the risk-free rate.10 This casts doubt on the claim that a large number of ﬁrms exhibit a
negative marginal product of investment. If shareholders believe that themarginal returns to keeping funds inside the ﬁrm are less
than their (outside) opportunity costs, they can and presumably would demand larger cash distributions.11
Secondly, for the tax cuts to raise the efﬁciency of the capital allocation in the economy, payouts must be reinvested in new
investment projects. However, it is generally much easier for government policies to get money out of the corporate sector than to
put it back in. An important factor that inhibits this ‘recycling of capital’ is asymmetric information (see e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981; Greenwald et al., 1984). Another factor can be international capital ﬂows that break the link between domestic saving and
investment (see e.g. Slemrod, 1988) and that have become a major force in driving US interest rates in recent years.
Chetty and Saez (2007) argue that the observed increases in dividend payments after the 2003 tax cut stem from a shift from
wasteful towards productive investments, implying largewelfare gains from the dividend tax cuts. As our paper shows, there are other
explanations for increases in dividend payments—with opposite welfare impacts, especially in the context of temporary tax changes.
There are several other dimensions of heterogeneity that may determine a ﬁrm's responses to dividend taxes. If markets are
rational, a temporary dividend tax cut will affect only ﬁrms that are expected to pay dividends while the low tax rate is in effect.
However, among the more dynamic sectors of the economy are the ‘new economy’ sectors, where any payouts are largely in forms
that are subjected to capital gains taxation.12 Capital market imperfections (such as the absence of good risk markets, etc.) mean
that there may be underinvestment in this part of the economy, relative to the ‘old’ and mature dividend paying ﬁrms. This is true
without agency problems, but even more so with agency problems. Lowering dividend taxes advantages the old economy, as
opposed to ﬁrms in the new economy, and thus may exacerbate the inefﬁciency of capital allocation.13
Those ﬁrms that pay out dividends and whose share prices should therefore beneﬁt from temporary dividend tax cuts are
mostly mature ﬁrms that do not issue equity and have little to gain from a lower cost of equity. Share prices and the cost of equity
for new ﬁrms that do issue equity should be hardly affected by a temporary tax cut, since they are unlikely to pay dividends while
the low tax rate is in effect.14
Our analysis does not take into account the budget deﬁcits/revenue shortfalls created by the dividend tax cut. In the absence of
lump-sum taxation, any replacement taxes that make up for the lost revenue will introduce further distortions. If taxes are not
raised, a higher stock of public debt may increase interest rates at the margin and thereby discourage investment.158 Jensen (1986), for example, emphasized the potential agency costs of free cash ﬂow. Gordon and Dietz (2009) and Chetty and Saez (2007) build these
considerations into their models of dividend taxation.
9 This assumes that take-over mechanisms do not work well — for reasons suggested by e.g. Stiglitz (1972), Grossman and Hart (1980) and Edlin and Stiglitz
(1995).
10 This is e.g. one of the ﬁndings of the literature on the equity premium puzzle, which asserts that a large part of the equity premium cannot be satisfactorily
explained by risk aversion (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Kocherlakota, 1996).
11 Indeed, a standard response to “excess cash holdings” by ﬁrms and the associated agency problems is what Hall (1988) termed the “backs-to-the-wall”
approach of corporate ﬁnance: shareholders demand large pay-outs from managers, leaving ﬁrms equity-constrained, as we model in this paper. This not only
removes the scope for excess investment, but the increased probability of bankruptcy to which it gives rise enhances managerial incentives (see Greenwald and
Stiglitz, 2003). Theories of excess corporate liquidity presume not only that shareholders cannot control managerial misbehavior, but also that they cannot
effectively control dividend distributions to mitigate such behavior.
12 These ‘smart’ sectors are not only smart in innovation; they have also ﬁgured out the dividend puzzle.
13 This provides support for one of the political criticisms of the temporary dividend tax cuts, that they beneﬁted the interests of old and stagnant industries
rather than those of young and dynamic industries. It is perhaps no accident that the Secretaries of Treasury in ofﬁce at the time of both tax cuts had been CEO's
of “old economy” ﬁrms; and that the sway of “new economy” ﬁrms was markedly lower in the Bush Administration than in the Clinton Administration.
14 Empirically, there is a controversy regarding the impact of the tax cut on the share prices of non-dividend paying ﬁrms: Auerbach and Hassett (2006, 2007)
ﬁnd that the share prices of ﬁrms that are likely to issue new equity increased signiﬁcantly as a result of the tax cut; Amromin et al. (2007) argue that the same
effect can be found for REITs and European stocks that are not affected by US dividend tax policy and should therefore be attributed to other market factors. As we
show in this paper, some of the ambiguity might be due to the fact that in 2003, investors assigned a positive probability to a more permanent extension of the
temporary tax cuts.
15 In the theoretical literature, Gourio and Miao (2007) perform a similar analysis, though mostly for the case of mature ﬁrms. As in Sinn (1991), ﬁrms in their
model engage in intertemporal tax arbitrage by adjusting the physical capital stock, which is subject to both decreasing returns to scale and adjustment costs. By
contrast, this paper explicitly allows ﬁrms to accumulate cash holdings, which better accounts for the behavior of ﬁrms that experience tax arbitrage
opportunities (a clear example being Microsoft). Furthermore, we aggregate over ﬁrms of all three stages of development so as to analyze the behavior of
macroeconomic variables.
146 A. Korinek, J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Public Economics 93 (2009) 142–159In Section 2 we develop our basic life-cycle model of capital constrained ﬁrms with random investment opportunities that are
subject to dividend taxation. Section 3 investigates the effects of unanticipated and anticipated dividend tax changes on ﬁrm
behavior. Section 4 analyzes how dividend tax policy affects macroeconomic variables such as aggregate investment. Section 5
brieﬂy discusses a simple model of the political economy of dividend taxation. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
Our model incorporates two key economic considerations: First, holding cash is costly for ﬁrms. Cash holdings within ﬁrms are
discounted at a higher rate than cash holdings outside, because of agency concerns (including managerial myopia) and because of
imperfections in riskmarkets, whichmay result in households being evenmore credit rationed than ﬁrms. Analytically, we assume
that the discount factor β on ﬁrms' future distributions is lower than the risk-free discount factor 11þr , where r is the risk-free
interest rate.16
Secondly, because of capital market imperfections, ﬁrms cannot instantaneously raise new capital for investment purposes —
they have to rely on their working capital. In our model, these constraints become particularly important because we assume that
investment opportunities arrive at random.17 If ﬁrms do not have cash on hand, these investment opportunities have to be forgone.
As a result, ﬁrms have an incentive to hold working capital – to give them the resources to take advantage of new opportunities as
they arrive – even though the rate of interest that they earn on cash is lower than the discount rate they face.
Our model allows us to analyze precisely these intertemporal trade-offs. Suppose that the amount of cash a ﬁrm has on hand at
the beginning of period t is Mt. The ﬁrm decides how much new equity Nt to issue and how much to pay in dividends Dt. This
results in total cash holdings of Mt+Nt−Dt on the ﬁrm's balance sheet.
Note that for the ﬁrm to raise Nt in new equity, investor have to pay (1+κ)Nt, where the premium κ≥0 captures transactions
costs, which can include e.g. underwriting fees (see Chen and Ritter, 2000) and underpricing because of agency problems (see e.g.
Asquith and Mullins, 1986).
After completing their ﬁnancial transactions, the ﬁrm can engage in real investment decisions. To capture the random arrival of
investment opportunities, we assume that a Bernoulli variable λ˜ t indicates every period whether a ﬁrm has an investment project. λ˜ t
takes on the value of 1 with probability p, which indicates that the ﬁrm can invest, and 0with probability (1−p). If a ﬁrm has a project,
then investing It dollars yields a pay-off of F(It) at the end of period t, with F(∙) being a neoclassical production function, e.g. of the form
F(It)=AItα. For notational conveniencewe deﬁne a corresponding net production function, or net proﬁts G(It)=F(It)−(1+r)It. Reﬂecting








circumvIt VMt þ Nt − Dt : ð1Þ
ﬁrm does not have an investment project, it keeps its cash holdings in a bank account and earns interest at rate r on it.18 AndIf a
thus the basic law of motion for cash holdings isM
~
tþ1 ¼ 1þ rð Þ Mt þ Nt − Dt½  þ λ
~
tG Itð Þ: ð2Þ
nagers maximize the stock market value of the representative ﬁrm, i.e. the stream of after-tax dividends minus the cost ofMa
equity issues, discounted by the factor β that reﬂects the agency problem:V M0; τð Þ ¼ max




βt 1 − τð ÞDt − 1þ κð ÞNt½ 
 
ð3Þs:t: constraints 1ð Þ; 2ð Þ;Dt z 0;Nt z 0
withM0N0 given:
ð4Þ
e constraints on Dt and Nt in Eq. (4) capture that both dividends and new equity issuance have to be non-negative.19Th
Substituting the law of motion (2) we can re-write the maximization problem in recursive form:V Mt; τð Þ ¼ max
Dt ;It ;Nt
1 − τð ÞDt − 1þ κð ÞNt þ βEV ð1þ rÞ½Mt þ Nt − Dt  þ λ~ t GðItÞ; τ
 
s:t: 4ð Þ ð5Þsimplicity, there is no aggregate market risk in our model; therefore the risk-free rate would be the appropriate discount rate in the absence of the
d market imperfection. See appendix A for a motivation of the discount factor βb 11þr from micro fundamentals based on a model of managerial myopia
ories of asymmetric information, such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Myers and Majluf (1984), have explained why ﬁrms may face credit and equity
ints. Our analysis does not depend on the particular explanation for the constraints, only on the fact that such constraints exist.
ur model, we assume that the rate of interest is ﬁxed, e.g. as would be the case in a small open economy. As discussed in Sinn (1991), qualitative results
e similar if the interest rate adjusted as ﬁrms paid out higher dividends.
he absence of any distortions, dividend payments would simply be the mirror image of new equity issuance. However, dividends are reduced by taxation
he cost of new equity is augmented by issuance costs. The constraints ensure that ﬁrms cannot circumvent dividend taxes by redeeming equity or





Fig. 1. Firm Value Function: Firms with MtbN⁎(τ) issue new equity; ﬁrms with N⁎(τ)≤MtbM⁎ reinvest all earnings and grow internally; ﬁrms with Mt≥M⁎ are
mature and pay dividends. (Parameter values: α=1/2, β=0.93, r=0.01, p=1/2, τ=38.6%, A calibrated so that M⁎=1.)
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dividends Dt (which simultaneously determines the amount of cash left on its balance sheet), as well as howmuch to invest in case
an investment opportunity arises.
It can be shown that the steady state value M⁎ for a ﬁrm's cash holdings is deﬁned by the equation20β pF0 Mð Þ þ 1 − pð Þ 1þ rð Þ  ¼ 1: ð6Þ
e term in square brackets represents the expected gross return of cash; it consists of the return if an investment opportunityTh
arises (with probability p) and the return if cash is kept in T-bills (with probability 1−p). The optimum level of cash balancesM⁎ is
reached when the expected return discounted by β is unity. Condition (6) is independent of the level of dividend taxes — the
behavior of mature ﬁrms is unaffected by dividend taxation. Pre-multiplying both sides of the equation by (1−τ), the left side of
Eq. (6) can be interpreted as the marginal payoff to investors of keeping one dollar of cash in the ﬁrm and the right hand side as the
marginal payoff of paying out one dollar in dividends, i.e. 1−τ. For ﬁrms in steady state, the two sides have to equal.
As shown in Fig.1, theﬁrm's value function is strictly concavewith a slopeV′(Mt) N1−τ forMt b M⁎. It is linearwith slopeV′(Mt)=1−τ
for mature ﬁrmswithMt ≥M⁎. Following the arguments of Stiglitz (1973,1976) and Sinn (1991), we show that the behavior of ﬁrms can
be analyzed by looking at three distinct stages, at new ﬁrms, growing ﬁrms and mature ﬁrms, depending on the level of cash holdings
inside a given ﬁrm.
2.1. New ﬁrms
New ﬁrms or existing ﬁrms with M0 b N⁎(τ) raise equity up to the threshold N⁎(τ), i.e. they set Nt=N⁎(τ)−Mt. The threshold
N⁎(τ) is determined as the point where the slope of the ﬁrm's value function as deﬁned by Eq. (5) equals the cost of raising equity,
as indicated by a tangent of slope 1+κ in Fig. 1:21V 0 N τð Þ; τð Þ ¼ 1þ κ ð7Þ
w ﬁrms do not pay dividends Dt=0 since themarginal value of their cash holdings, V′=1+κ after raising equity, is higher thanNe
the marginal value of dividends, 1−τ. When an investment opportunity arises, they invest their entire cashholdings It=Mt+Nt.
2.2. Growing ﬁrms
For Mt ∈[N⁎(τ), M⁎) the ﬁrm's marginal value of funds is too low to raise new equity, but too high to pay out dividends, i.e.
1+κ≤V′(Mt) b 1−τ. In this region, a ﬁrm grows internally by investing and retaining its earnings until it reaches the steady
state with Mt=M⁎. Such a ﬁrm neither raises equity nor issues dividends, i.e. Nt=Dt=0, and invests its entire cash holdings
when an investment opportunity arises, i.e. It=Mt.etailed analytical derivation of the results in this section is available from the authors upon request.
ur analysis, ﬁrms only issue equity once. In practice, young ﬁrms often issue equity in several tranches because of asymmetries of information: insiders
ow (or believe) that information will become available that will reveal that the true value of the company is higher than currently believed.
Fig. 2. Average Evolution of Firm: The ﬁgure shows how investment, production, and dividend payments for a new ﬁrm evolve in expectation over the ﬁrst 15
periods. In the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm raises N⁎(τ), it invests on average pN⁎ and produces pF(N⁎). In period 15, expected investment and production are almost
indistinguishable from the steady state values pM⁎ and pF(M⁎).
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A ﬁrm withMt≥M⁎ is in its steady state. Every period, it pays out its cash holdings in excess of the optimal holdings M⁎ in the
form of dividends Dt=Mt−M⁎. If an investment opportunity arises, then the ﬁrm invests It=M⁎ and earns F (M⁎). Next period the
ﬁrm distributes all but the amount of cash required for new investments, i.e. it pays a dividend Dt+1=F (M⁎)−M⁎. Otherwise, if no
investment opportunity arises, it earns interest of rM⁎, which it pays out at the beginning of the next period.22 Once the ﬁrm has
reached the threshold M⁎, its cash holdings will never again fall below this value, given constant parameters values.
Note that the equilibrium condition (6) implies that F′(M⁎)b1+ r, i.e. ﬁrm investment is constrained in steady state — agency
concerns lead ﬁrms to pay out cash because of managerial myopia or because this reduces the amount of ‘free cash’ that managers
might abuse. We will show below that inducing ﬁrms to reduce cash holdings further, e.g. because of intertemporal tax arbitrage,
entails a ﬁrst-order cost.
Since the arrival of investment opportunities is random, the path along this life-cycle will differ from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. We have
depicted the average cash balances of a new ﬁrm over its ﬁrst 15 periods in Fig. 2. As can be seen, almost all new ﬁrms in our
example have reached the mature stage with Mt=M⁎ after 10 periods.
Before proceeding to our analysis of changes in dividend taxation, let us note that our assumptions regarding investment
opportunities, capital stock, access to capital markets, and incentives for dividend payments have been made mainly for analytical
simplicity. There are four dimensions along which the presented model could be generalized without signiﬁcantly affecting the
predictions of the paper:
Firstly, instead of a binary Bernoulli variable determining an investment opportunity, we could allow for opportunities of different
magnitudes, e.g. that ﬁrms face a production function of the form η~t F (It), where η~t a[0, a∞) is a random variable. Alternatively, we
could allow ﬁrms to carry unused opportunities into future periods at some cost. The assumption that postponing investment is costly
corresponds to the real world, since ﬁrms are subject to e.g. changing competition, including competition from abroad, and evolving
consumer tastes. As long as there is at least some cost associated with not fully seizing an investment opportunity in the period in
which it is optimal to do so, changes in ﬁrms' cash balances induced by changes in dividend taxation can have real effects.
Secondly,we could add a state variable forﬁrms' long-termcapital holdings to our analysis. In the current paperwehave focusedon
holdings of cash rather than long-term capital since cashorother liquid short-termassets are themost convenient tools for short-term
intertemporal tax arbitrage. This should not be understood as suggesting that ﬁrms' long-term capital holdings are unimportant in
other economic questions, but for the purpose of analyzing intertemporal tax arbitrage it keeps our model more tractable.
Thirdly, the extreme case of having no access to capital markets once an investment opportunity has materialized could easily
be relaxed. We could for example assume that ﬁrms are subject to a maximum debt equity ratio, and that this is already built into
the production function F(∙) given above. Our results hold as long as internal and external ﬁnance are not or not always perfect
substitutes, e.g. because there are costs to accessing capital markets. This is certainly true in the real world.
Fourthly, regarding ﬁrms' payout policy, the assumption that future dividend payments are discounted at a higher rate than the
risk-free interest rate can be replaced by any other theory of why ﬁrms make dividend payments, without changing the
implications of tax changes for ﬁrm investment. The only requirement is that changes in tax rates over time affect ﬁrms' marginal
incentive to pay out dividends. An example for a theory of dividend payments other than agency costs is e.g. the accumulated
retained earnings tax, which punishes ﬁrms for holdings excessive cash balances. As long as future changes in tax rates lead ﬁrms
to alter their payout behavior at the margin, ﬁrms' cash balances and thus their investment and output will be affected. Our model
is compatible with share repurchases as long as there is at least some role left to dividends, e.g. if share repurchases are capped
because of IRS rules that would subject excessive repurchases to dividend taxation.22 This yields the result that dividends are variable. In practice, dividends often show a high degree of stability related to their signaling role, as discussed e.g. in
Ross (1977) or Bhattacharya (1979) and evidenced in DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990). In our model dividends perform no signaling role. Including a coherent
model in which dividends might perform such a role would greatly complicate the analysis, e.g. by requiring random shifts in the production function of the ﬁrm.
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We now use the model developed in the previous section to analyze how capital constrained ﬁrms react to changes in the
dividend tax rate.
3.1. Unanticipated permanent tax changes
For the investment decisions of mature ﬁrms, an unanticipated permanent change in the dividend tax rate in either direction is
neutral. This is typical formodels that follow the ‘new view’ of dividend taxation, since the cost of retained earnings and the returns of
investment for mature ﬁrms are reduced by the same factor 1−τ, as we noted in the introduction. However, in accordance with the
‘traditional view' elements of our model, the amount of equity that new ﬁrms raise is affected by permanent dividend tax changes:
Proposition 1. Unanticipated permanent tax changes affect the amount of equity that young ﬁrms raise, but leave the ﬁnancing and
investment decisions of growing and mature ﬁrms that no longer access equity markets unaffected.
Analytically, note that a ﬁrm solving problem (3) issues equity at most once, in period 0, and if it issues equity it does not
simultaneously pay dividends. Focusing on the ﬁrm's problem after period 0, we can therefore see that dividend taxation scales the
value function of the ﬁrm by a factor 1−τ so that V (Mt;τ)=(1−τ)V (Mt;0). For mature ﬁrms that solve problem (3), this implies that
the steady state level of cash balances and investment M⁎ as well as all other ﬁnancing and investment decisions are unchanged,
since the linear factor (1−τ) drops out of the maximization problem. This neutrality result holds even though the market value of
the ﬁrm is a declining function of the tax rate.
By the same logic, the slope of the value function is V′(Mt;τ)=(1−τ)V′(Mt;0), which is declining in the dividend tax rate τ.
Therefore the amount of equity N⁎(τ) that new ﬁrms raise is a declining function of the tax rate as well, i.e. N⁎(τ)b0. Furthermore,
in case of a tax cut from, say, τH to τL there might be some growing ﬁrms that raised a low amount of equity N⁎(τH) under the old
high tax rate, but that ﬁnd it optimal to raise more equity under the new lower tax rate since their cash holdings satisfy
N⁎(τH) ≤Mt b N⁎(τL). By contrast, after unanticipated tax increases, existing ﬁrms never raise more equity.23
3.2. Anticipated tax increases
These results contrast strongly with the case of anticipated changes in dividend taxes, which provide incentives for all ﬁrms
with sufﬁcient cash holdings to engage in intertemporal tax arbitrage:
Proposition 2. The anticipation of a dividend tax increase induces mature ﬁrms to pay out a special dividend in the period prior to the
increase, which reduces their cash holdings below the equilibrium value M⁎, lowering aggregate investment for the following periods.
Furthermore, as the anticipated increase approaches, the amount of equity that new ﬁrms issue progressively falls.
Throughout our discussion, let us denote by Vs(Mt;τL, τH) the value function of a ﬁrm that expects a dividend tax increase in s
periods, i.e. that is subject to a low dividend tax rate τL for the next s periods and then to a higher rate τH for the indeﬁnite future.
Similarly, we denote by Ms⁎(τL, τH) the ﬁrm's optimal cash balances s periods before the tax increase. (Note that V0 (Mt; τL, τH)≡
V(Mt; τH) and M0⁎(τL, τH)=M⁎.)
Mature ﬁrms and internally growing ﬁrms with sufﬁcient cash balances have an incentive to engage in tax arbitrage, since
shareholders can save taxes ifﬁrmspayout ahigheramountof dividends in the low taxperiodprecedinga tax increase.However, this tax
arbitrage is limited by the fact that ﬁrms need cash in order to take advantage of random investment opportunities. The optimal amount
of cash balancesM1⁎(τL, τH) balances these two factors off against each other:M1⁎ is the threshold atwhich themarginal value of keeping
one dollar inside the ﬁrm under the high tax rate equals the value of paying out one dollar now under the low tax rate:23 This
is not).
equity tV 0 MT1; τH
 	 ¼ 1 − τL:
ond the threshold M1⁎, ﬁrms' value function V1(Mt−1; τL, τH) is linear and increasing at rate 1−τL, since all cash in excess ofBey
M1⁎ is paid out and taxed at the rate τL. Note that in earlier periods, i.e. in periods t−2, t−3 etc., internally growing andmature ﬁrms
do not alter their behavior in response to the impending tax increase at time t: they accumulate cash balances up toM⁎ and pay out
any excess, because there are no tax arbitrage opportunities. However, ﬁrm value falls in anticipation of the higher tax rate in the
future (see the value functions in Fig. 3).
After ﬁrms have paid their special dividend in period t−1, their reduced cash holdings constrain investment, earnings, and
dividends in the period t of the tax hike and in the following periods, until ﬁrms have restored their optimal level of cash balances
M⁎ through internal savings.asymmetry reﬂects the asymmetry between lowering and raising equity (distributing funds to shareholders is subject to the dividend tax, raising equity
The marginal value of dividends to shareholders is 1−τ; the marginal cost to issuing equity is 1+κ. Both the dividend tax and the cost involved in issuing
hus increase the wedge between the cost of new equity and the cost of capital in the form of retained earnings.
Fig. 3. Anticipated Dividend Tax Increase, Value Functions: This ﬁgure shows the value functions {V15,…,V1} of ﬁrms in the 15 periods prior to an anticipated
dividend tax increase from τL=0% to τH=38.6%. When the future tax increase is announced, the value function jumps immediately from the top curve V(Mt; τL)
down to V15. Firms' value functions then move every period a small step closer to V(Mt; τH).
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looking and expect that much of the payoff of their equity investment will occur in the future when dividend taxes are high. In the
period directly before the tax increase, new ﬁrms raise the same (low) amount of new equity as if the higher tax ratewas already in
effect, i.e. N1⁎(τL, τH)=N⁎(τH). This is because all dividends that will be paid out by these ﬁrms will be subject to the high tax rate.
To see what happens to new equity issuance in earlier periods, we need to analyze the value functions of ﬁrms in those periods.
If a dividend tax hike is anticipated for time t, then ﬁrms' value function in period t−s, s N0 can be denoted iteratively asVs Mt − s; τL; τHð Þ ¼ max 1 − τLð ÞDt − s þ βE Vs − 1 M
~





have depicted the value functions V1 to V15 for the 15 periods preceding an anticipated dividend tax hike in Fig. 3. The upmostWe
value function in theﬁgure representsﬁrms that are permanently subject to the old (low) tax rate τL; the lowest curve representsﬁrms
that are subject to the new (high) tax rate τH forever. If an increase in the dividend tax rate is announced s periods ahead, this implies
thatﬁrms' value function immediately jumps from the upmost curve down toVs(τL, τH). As can be seen in theﬁgure, the series of value
functions Vk (τL, τH), k=s, s−1, …1 moves every period a little closer to the ﬁnal value function V(Mt;τH), which will come into effect
under the new dividend tax rate. The amount of equity Ns⁎(τL, τH) that new ﬁrms would issue in a given year t−s is depicted as the
tangent with slope 1+κ to the value function Vs(∙). Analytically it can be determined by the condition Vs (Ns⁎(∙);τL, τH)=1+κ. Clearly,
Ns⁎(∙) decreases the closer the economy comes to the dividend tax increase.
The effects of an anticipated tax increase on new ﬁrms thus follow what is predicted by the traditional view of dividend
taxation, since the marginal source of funds for new ﬁrms is equity markets. For this category of ﬁrms, our ﬁndings are also
consistent with Alvarez et al. (1998) who discuss how ﬁrm investment reacts to the anticipation of tax policy changes.
An important implication of our results is that a tax cut that is scheduled to expire after a few periods does not raise the amount
of investment bymuch and has a signiﬁcantly smaller impact on the cost of equity of new ﬁrms thanwhat would be predicted from
analyzing a permanent tax cut of identical magnitude.
3.3. Probabilistic tax increases
Firms react in a similar way if there is uncertainty about whether a dividend tax increase will occur in a future period. Such a
situation can arise for example if a dividend tax cut has been implemented in the past and ﬁrms expect (e.g. for political economy
reasons or because of large ﬁscal deﬁcits) that the tax cut will be undone in a future period.
Suppose that there is a constant probability π each period that the prevailing dividend tax rate τL will rise to τH. Then mature
ﬁrms reduce their cash balances to Mπ⁎(τL, τH)bM⁎ while the low tax rate is in effect. Mπ⁎ is the point at which the expected
stochastic tax savings from paying out a higher dividend now (left-hand side) equal the cost of forgoing a potential investment
opportunity next period because of cash constraints (right-hand side):1 − τL ¼ πV 0 Mπ; τH
 	þ β 1 − πð Þ 1 − τLð Þ pF 0 Mπ 	þ 1 − pð Þ 1þ rð Þ :
turally, mature ﬁrms depress their cash balances more the greater the probability of the tax increase and the larger theNa
expected difference in tax rates. Young ﬁrms that raise new equity are affected in a similar way to what we discussed in the
previous subsection. A direct implication of the observation that Mπ⁎(τL, τH)bM⁎ is the following:
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dividend taxes immediately.
What is perhaps evenmore striking is that whether the government raises or leaves the tax rate (permanently) unchanged, ﬁrm
investment and tax revenues will increase. Once the uncertainty about a possible dividend tax increase is resolved (in either
direction), mature ﬁrms increase their cash holdings back to M⁎.
3.4. Anticipated tax cuts
We next investigate a dividend tax cut from τH to τL that is anticipated s periods ahead. The general idea is that for new ﬁrms,
the cost of capital falls in anticipation of the tax cut; for mature ﬁrms the anticipated tax cut creates an opportunity to engage in
intertemporal tax arbitrage by postponing dividend payments:
Proposition 3. An anticipated dividend tax cut leads to a temporary increase in investment by internally growing andmature ﬁrms that
engage in tax arbitrage while the old (high) tax rate is in effect. Furthermore, it increases the amount of equity that new ﬁrms raise.
Mature ﬁrms can delay dividend payments to later periods and thereby save on dividend taxes by temporarily increasing their
cash holdings above M⁎. Speciﬁcally, they keep all their cash earnings on the balance sheet for k periods preceding a tax cut, i.e.
Ms=∞ for s=1,…k, where k is the largest integer such that 1−τHb (1−τL)[β(1+ r)]k. During these k periods, paying dividends in the
future at the lower tax rate is – despite the high discount rate –more favorable to investors than paying out immediately under the
high tax rate, and therefore ﬁrms pay zero dividends and retain all earnings.24 In period k+1 before the tax cut, ﬁrms accumulate
cash balances up to Mk+1⁎ NM⁎, which is deﬁned by24 For
25 This
reactionβ pF 0 Mkþ1
 	þ 1 − pð Þ 1þ rð Þ  ¼ 1 − τH
1 − τL
 1
β 1þ rð Þ½ k
:
noted earlier that, because of agency considerations, ﬁrms' equilibrium cash holdingsM⁎ and their steady state investmentWe
It=M⁎ is below the optimum investment I⁎ in a neoclassical world without capital constraints, as deﬁned by F′(I⁎)=1+ r. Since
postponing dividends raises ﬁrm cash holdings, it enables ﬁrms to more fully take advantage of investment opportunities.
Speciﬁcally, arbitraging ﬁrms invest all their cash holdings up to I⁎NM⁎when an investment opportunity arrives and keep the rest
in cash, i.e. they are subject to constant returns to scale above I⁎, earning the risk-free return r.
In period k+1 before the tax cut, optimal cash holdings are M⁎bMk+1⁎ b I⁎ – ﬁrms increase cash holdings above the long-run
steady stateM⁎, but are still cash-constrained in equilibrium because the incentives for tax arbitrage are only weak. They pay out
any cash holdings in excess ofMk +1⁎ . After that, no further dividend payment is made for the next k periods, i.e. until after the tax
cut. Once the cut has been implemented, all the accumulated excess cash holdings Mt−M⁎ are distributed to shareholders in the
form of a special dividend at the low dividend tax rate τL.
If a dividend tax cut is expected to occur more than k+1 periods in advance, then the payout and investment policies of existing
ﬁrms are unaltered up until period k+1. However, share prices rise immediately in anticipation of the tax cut.
New ﬁrms realize that most of their dividend payments will be made in the future when taxes are low; therefore ﬁrms' value
function jumps immediately and continues to move up until the tax cut is enacted. We have illustrated an example of the 15 periods
before an anticipated cut is enacted in Fig. 4. The bottom line depicts ﬁrms' value function under the old high-tax regime; the top line
represents the value function after the tax cutwas enacted. The curves in between illustrate howﬁrms' valuation gradually approaches
the after-tax cut valuation.
The tangents with slope 1+κ to the various value functionsV15, V14, etc. (markedwith vertical ticks) indicate the amounts of equity
thatnewﬁrms issue in the respective periods. In theperiod t−1 immediately preceding a taxcut,ﬁrms issue the sameamountof equity
N1⁎(τH, τL)=N⁎(τL) as if the cutwas already enacted, since all their future dividendswill be taxed at the lower rate. In earlier periods, the
optimal amount of new equity continually rises, i.e. Ns−1⁎ NNs⁎. Young ﬁrms with low cash holdings Mt− sbNs⁎(τH, τL) thus have an
incentive to access equitymarkets again, andpossiblymultiple times,whenever their internal cost of capital ishigher than thenewcost
of equity, given the impending dividend tax cut.25
3.5. Probabilistic tax cuts
If there is uncertainty about whether a dividend tax cut will occur in a future period, similar conclusions hold. An example for
this situation occurred in 2002, when political parties were discussing the possibility of a reduction in the dividend tax rate.
Analytically, if ﬁrms expect a dividend tax cut from τH to τL with a probability of π in every time period until the tax cut is
realized, they accumulate higher cash balances up to a level of Mπ⁎(τH, τL)NM⁎ while there is uncertainty. Mπ⁎ is deﬁned byβ 1 − Eτtþ1ð Þ pF0 Mπ
 	þ 1 − pð Þ 1þ rð Þ  ¼ 1 − τH if 1 − τH N β 1þ rð Þ 1 − E τtþ1ð Þ
Mπ ¼ ∞ if 1 − τH V β 1þ rð Þ 1 − Eτtþ1ð Þdividend tax cuts that are small in comparison to the equity premium, it is possible that k=0.
is an important asymmetry to anticipated tax increases as discussed in subsection 3.2: ﬁrms cannot undo equity issues when the cost of equity rises in
to an anticipated tax increase.
Fig. 4. Anticipated Dividend Tax Cut, Value Functions: The value functions {V15,…,V1} of ﬁrms in the 15 periods prior to an anticipated dividend tax cutmove closer and
closer to the value function V(Mt; τL) prevailing under the new dividend tax rate. The amount of equity that new ﬁrms issue, indicated by the tangentwith slope 1+κ to
each value function, rises.
152 A. Korinek, J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Public Economics 93 (2009) 142–159where Eτt+1=(1−π)τH+πτL is the expected dividend tax rate next period. In other words, ﬁrms reduce their dividend payments
and increase their cash holdings in order to take advantage of the expected lower dividend tax in the future. If the tax cut is likely or
large enough, as described by the second inequality, ﬁrms will not pay any dividends until the tax cut has materialized. Instead,
they would be willing to accumulate arbitrarily large cash balances.
Corollary 2. If there is uncertainty about whether there will be a tax decrease, it pays the government to postpone resolving that
uncertainty (either way). In the interim, investment is higher.
3.6. Temporary dividend tax changes
Essentially, an unanticipated temporary change in dividend taxes is equivalent to an unanticipated change in one direction
followed by an anticipated change in the reverse direction at a later point in time.
Let us ﬁrst focus on temporary dividend tax cuts. Assume that a high dividend tax rate of τH is unexpectedly reduced to τL for k
periods, after which it returns to τH. As discussed before, the unanticipated reduction in the tax rate increases the value of all ﬁrms.
For new ﬁrms, this increases the amount of equity that they raise, but it does not have any effects on the behavior of mature ﬁrms.
However, note that both the increase in stock prices and in the amount of equity that new ﬁrms issue is strongly mitigated by the
fact that a dividend tax rise after k periods is anticipated. Fig. 3 reveals thatﬁrms' value functions for the periods preceding a typical tax
hike are actuallymuch closer toV(Mt; τH), i.e. the lowest line in theﬁgure, than toV (Mt; τL), the highest line thatwould correspond to a
permanent tax cut. In other words, the positive effects of lower dividend taxes in terms of a lower cost of equity is strongly reduced by
the fact that a dividend tax hike in a future period is impending. The reason is that young ﬁrms usually do not pay out dividends in the
ﬁrst few years of their existence, but only once they have accumulated their steady state holdings of cashM⁎. We can thus conclude
that temporarydividend taxcuts reduce themarginal costof equityV ′(Mt)mostly for thoseﬁrms thatdonot need it (matureﬁrms), but
hardly affect the marginal cost of equity for new ﬁrms that need to access capital markets. In the extreme case of a one-period
temporary tax cut, this leads to the following result.
Proposition 4. The effects of an unanticipated one-period dividend tax cut on aggregate investment are unambiguously negative.
New ﬁrms do not raise more equity than if the tax rate had been kept at τH, since taxes will be back at their earlier level when
they make their ﬁrst distributions. At the same time, because of arbitrage considerations, internally growing and mature ﬁrms pay
out a special dividend to reduce their cash holdings to M1⁎(τL, τH), and their cash balances will be lower for a number of periods
until ﬁrms have recovered their optimum, M⁎.
The opposite conclusions hold for a temporary dividend tax increase. While the amount of equity that new ﬁrms issue during
the high tax period would fall, ﬁrms hold higher cash balances thanM⁎ in anticipation of the impending dividend tax cut, and this
allows them to invest higher amounts. Again, the extreme case of an unanticipated one-period increase would have
unambiguously positive effects on aggregate investment, though only for one period.
4. Aggregate investment and output
This section investigates the effects of dividend tax policy on aggregate investment, summing up across all ﬁrms in the
economy. For a ﬁrm of age a that was started a periods ago, we deﬁne average investment as I
–
a:=pE[Ia], the probability of receiving
Fig. 5. Unanticipated Dividend Tax Cut: After an unanticipated dividend tax cut from 38.6% to 15% in period 4, the amount of new equity N⁎ that new ﬁrms issue
rises signiﬁcantly. However, aggregate investment AI, production AY, and gross dividend payments AD increase only modestly. The redistributory effect of the tax
change, on the other hand, is very strong.
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where T is the number of years after which all ﬁrms of vintage a have reached their steady state cash holdings M⁎. Similarly, we





Assume that at any given time t the economy consists of a mass zt −1 of existing ﬁrms, and a mass Δzt=γzt−1 of new ﬁrms is
started, yielding a total of zt=(1+γ)zt−1. Firms are indexed by i and follow the maximization problem and the resulting rules
described in the previous sections. The arrival of investment opportunities is independent among ﬁrms, yielding deterministic
values for all macroeconomic variables.
In steady state the fraction of ﬁrms at a given stage of development, say age a, is then constant at γ
1þγð Þaþ1. However, the total
mass of ﬁrms is increasing, reﬂecting growth in the economy. At time t the total mass of ﬁrms of age a is γ
1þγð Þaþ1 zt . Aggregate
investment AIt at time t can then be expressed asAIt ¼
Z zt
0
























Fig. 6. Anticipated Dividend Tax Increase: The amount of equity N⁎ that new ﬁrms issue starts falling when the tax increase is announced, causing a small decline in
aggregate investment, output, and dividend payments. In the period preceding the tax increase (period 7), ﬁrms pay out a special dividend, reducing aggregate
investment AIt, output AYt and dividends ADt for periods to come. (The dotted line in the graph for investment represents the path of ﬁrms' optimal cash holdings
Mt. It always lies above AI since not all ﬁrms are in steady state.)
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equilibrium in the sense that we take the interest rate as given and do not allow for e.g. offsetting monetary policy actions.26 As we
argued earlier, this may be justiﬁed if the economy is open to international capital ﬂows, which break the link between domestic
saving and investment and determine interest rates exogenously. In reality, some of the dividends paid out may be re-invested in
the domestic economy. But empirically, there is some question about the extent to which this may be so.27 Since dividend taxes are
only a small part of government revenue, we furthermore disregard the effects of dividend taxation on the government's budget
position.
Following Mehra and Prescott (1985) we chose β=0.93 and r=1%. In order to replicate a typical growth rate of the economy we
calibrated γ=3%.28 For the other structural parameters we used values of α=1/2 and p=1/2, and A was chosen so that M⁎=1.
However, our results are robust to alternative calibrations.26 Even if there is a feedback effect on interest rates (see e.g. the reasoning in Section 3.2. of Sinn, 1991), all the effects that we discuss are still present, though
they are mitigated by endogenous adjustments in the interest rate.
27 For example, if we assume that the Fed sets interest rates so as to maintain a given level of GDP, and if there are some individuals who are cash constrained (à
la Stiglitz
^
–Weiss) and spend some of the dividends they receive, then consumption will be higher and investment lower: in equilibrium, not all of the money will
have “re-circulated” back into investment. More generally, our qualitative results hold as long as the marginal propensity to invest (directly or indirectly) of the
recipients of dividends is lower than had the money remained inside the ﬁrm.
28 Empirically, the value of new equity issued ﬂuctuates wildly from year to year, but γ=3% is a reasonable approximation to the average long-run amount of
equity issuance.
Fig. 7. Risk of Dividend Tax Increase: In periods 1 to 3 ﬁrms anticipate that there is a π=25% risk of a dividend tax hike from 15% to 38.6%. This reduces mature ﬁrms'
cash reserves and depresses aggregate investment. The tax increase is enacted in period 4, and ﬁrms' optimal cash reserves (the dotted line in the upper right pane)
revert to M⁎. Aggregate investment increases even though new ﬁrms issue less equity N⁎ under the higher dividend tax rate.
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We showed in the previous section that the behavior of internally growing and mature ﬁrms (and hence their contribution to
investment) is unaffected by dividend taxes. However, new ﬁrms issue less equity the higher the dividend tax rate and therefore
take longer to reach the mature stage. This reduces aggregate investment, but since only a small fraction of investment in the
economy is performed by new ﬁrms that access equitymarkets, the aggregate effect of unanticipated dividend tax changes is small.
Proposition 5. In response to unanticipated changes in dividend taxes, aggregate investment AIt, aggregate output AYt and aggregate
dividend payments ADt in the economy are lower the higher the tax rate.
We depict an example of an unanticipated reduction of a τH=38.6% dividend tax to τL=15% in Fig. 5.29 The tax cut occurs
unexpectedly in period 4 and immediately raises the amount of new equity N⁎ that new ﬁrms issue. Since the optimal amount of
cash balancesM⁎ for mature ﬁrms remains unchanged, the average ﬁrm in the economy has only slightly higher cash balances, as a
result of the higher N⁎. As a result, aggregate investment AI, production AY, and gross dividend payments AD increase very
modestly. However, the distribution of ﬁrms' dividends changes signiﬁcantly: shareholders net dividend receipts (1−τ)AD increase
steeply; the government's revenue from dividend taxation τAD falls sharply. Thus the redistributory effect of changes in dividend
taxation is an order of magnitude stronger than any efﬁciency effects.30 In our simulation model, the described cut of a 38.6%29 We have normalized all aggregate variables in this ﬁgure as well as in the following ﬁgures by zt in order to distinguish the effect of tax policy from the
general growth of the economy.
30 If the lower government revenue forces a reduction in public spending and if there is a multiplier associated with government expenditure, then the dividend
tax cut would potentially have a strongly negative effect on output.
Fig. 8. Anticipated Dividend Tax Cut: At k=5 periods before an anticipated dividend tax cut from 38.6% to 15%, ﬁrms stop paying dividends AD and accumulate cash
instead. This increases the aggregate amounts of investment AI and production AY that ﬁrms can engage in. After the tax cut is enacted, here in period 11, ﬁrms pay
out all their excess cash and return to the steady state. The amount of equity that new ﬁrms issue, N⁎, increases as a result of the tax cut, but the overall effect on
aggregate investment once the cut has materialized is lower than in the periods of anticipation.
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that due to various tax deductions, the estimated effective dividend tax rate in the US economy is actually much lower than the
nominal rate.
4.2. Aggregate effects of an anticipated tax increase
As discussed in the previous section, the results for an anticipated tax change differ substantially. In Fig. 6 we have depicted an
example of a tax increase from τL=15% to τH=38.6% that is anticipated to occur in period 8. The effects on aggregate
macroeconomic variables are twofold: Firstly, new ﬁrms issue less and less equity both in the periods leading up to the increase
and under the new tax rate, reducing their investment and prolonging the time for them to reach the steady state. Secondly, all
mature ﬁrms pay out a special dividend in the period immediately preceding the tax increase, reducing their investment for
periods to come. Since most ﬁrms in the economy are mature, this second effect is much more pronounced than the ﬁrst one. As
can be seen from the two graphs at the bottom, the redistributory effects of the tax increase are even stronger than the direct
effects on investment.
Fig. 7 depicts an example of the case that ﬁrms expect a dividend tax increase with a constant probability of arrival of π=25% in
each of the following periods. This reduces their optimal cash balances toMπ⁎ and depresses aggregate investment. In period 4, the
tax increase is enacted, and ﬁrms' optimal level of cash holdings reverts to M⁎NMπ⁎, which increases investment activity in the
economy. However, the amount of equity that new ﬁrms issue decreases in period 4 as a result of the higher dividend tax rate.
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An example of ﬁrms' reaction to an anticipated dividend tax cut is given in Fig. 8: Starting from period 1 agents foresee that
dividend taxes will fall from τH=38.6% to τL=0% in period t=11. The amount of equity that new ﬁrms issue slowly increases
between periods 1 and 11.
Mature ﬁrms' payout policy is unchanged up to period 5, inwhich they reduce their dividend payments. From period 6 to period
10, ﬁrms make no dividend payments and accumulate all of their earnings. This allows them to invest more in case an investment
opportunity arises, but only up to a maximum of I⁎, since the marginal product of capital turns below the risk-free interest rate
after this threshold. Aggregate investment AI and output AY are thus signiﬁcantly above their long-run equilibrium value.
In period 11, when the tax cut is enacted, mature ﬁrms pay a special dividend, which returns them to the steady state. New ﬁrms
can now issue a slightly larger amount of equity, but as the ﬁgure illustrates, aggregate investment and output are lower once the
anticipated dividend tax cut has materialized than during the periods when it was expected.
A comparison of this example with the unanticipated tax increase in Fig. 5 illustrates that the macroeconomic effects of
anticipated tax changes are by an order of magnitude higher than that of unanticipated changes. We can derive ﬁve very clear
implications for policymakers from this observation:
1. Unanticipated changes in dividend taxes have only insigniﬁcantmacroeconomic effects, but strong redistributory consequences.
2. If policymakers want to increase dividend taxes or if ﬁrms expect an increase in the future, it is better to enact it immediately.
3. If policymakerswant to reducedividend taxesor ifﬁrms expect a reduction in the future, back-load the taxcut andkeepﬁrmswaiting.
4. Unanticipated temporary dividend tax cuts are equivalent to an immediate unanticipated tax cut followed by an anticipated tax
increase at a later time; they have an overall negative effect on investment and output.
5. Conversely, unanticipated temporary dividend tax increases have an overall positive effect on investment and output.
5. Political economy of dividend tax changes
In democratic societies, there are frequent changes in party rule, and parties often adjust the levels of tax rates when they come
to power. The effect of any dividend tax policy thus has to be analyzed in a dynamic context that explicitly takes the possibility of
regime changes and future changes in tax policy into account. This is of even greater importance, since we have shown in the
previous sections that the level of dividend taxation itself does not have strong macroeconomic effects, but that anticipated
changes in the tax rate can introduce signiﬁcant distortions into the economy.
Even if the party in power succeeds in deﬁning a “clear” policy,31 the governing party cannot, in a democracy, prevent the
opposition from suggesting that, should they get elected, there will be a change in policy. Indeed, contestable politics focuses on
changing policies, and this is desirable. It is hard to envision a politics in which each party claims that it will simply continue with
the policies of its rivals.
Let us assume an economy with two parties, conservatives and social democrats, that have different preferences over tax rates.
When conservatives are in power, private agents anticipate that tax rates will rise as soon as social democrats will come to power.
Under the hypothesis that party rule is governed by a Markov process, this is similar to the model of Section 3, where we have
shown that ﬁrms pay out higher dividends and hold lower cash balances if there is a risk of tax increases. As a result, they are
comparatively constrained in their investment behavior when an investment opportunity arises. These effects of tax arbitrage are
stronger, the larger the expected dividend tax increase.
In our analysis of the previous sections, we have taken tax rates as given. But we could also derive the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium in the game between two political parties. Because of their different preferences, the social democrats impose higher
tax rates than the conservatives. It is easy to see that this fact leads the conservatives to adjust the optimal tax rate that they
impose: The larger the expected tax increase when conservatives lose power, the more incentive ﬁrms have to engage in
intertemporal arbitrage and tomake large payouts during conservative rule, which constrain their investment and contract output
under the conservative regime. If conservatives put a highweight on investment and output under their regime, theywill therefore
implement a higher tax rate thanwhat would be optimal if they could legislate tax rates permanently. This raises investment under
their regime relative to the opposition's regime.
When social democrats are in power, on the other hand, ﬁrms anticipate a tax cut the next time that conservatives enter
government. As shown in Section 5, they pay out lower dividends and accumulate higher cash balances than under conservative
rule, which allows them to invest more when an investment opportunity arises. This effect is stronger the larger the expected tax
cut. The social democrats know that (ﬁrms know that) when the conservatives seize power, taxes will be lower. If social democrats
also place a large weight on investment and output in their preferences, they also have an incentive to raise dividend taxes so as to
maximize the expected tax cut. As a result, both parties exhibit a bias towards “excessive” dividend taxation.32 We present a more
detailed analysis of this political game as well as a set of more general implications for the analysis of public policies in contestable
democracies in Korinek and Stiglitz (2008).31 And many have failed to do so
^
— as an extreme example, there were three major tax “reforms” under Reagan in
^
5 years.
32 By contrast, if parties placed a large weight on dividend payouts under their regime, e.g. because they value the government revenue derived from dividend
taxation or the resulting income stream to investors, both parties would exhibit a bias towards inefﬁciently low tax rates: each party would lower tax rates
competitively so as to induce ﬁrms to pay out more under its regime.
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This paper has investigated the dynamic effects of dividend taxation on macroeconomic variables such as investment and
output using a life cycle model of capital constrained ﬁrms. Firms in our model start out by issuing equity, then they accumulate
more funds by retaining their earnings, i.e. internal saving, and when they reach the mature stage they pay out dividends.
Using quantitative simulations we ﬁnd that unanticipated tax changes have rather small effects on aggregate investment, since
they only impact howmuch equity new ﬁrms issue and since new ﬁrms are only a small part of the economy. However, anticipated
or temporary dividend tax changes create opportunities for intertemporal tax arbitrage for growing and mature ﬁrms and can
signiﬁcantly distort both ﬁrm-level and aggregate corporate cash holdings and investment decisions.
For example, an unanticipated temporary dividend tax cut, such as the one enacted in the United States in 2003 and extended in
2006, can be seen as an unanticipated tax cut, followed by an anticipated tax increase at the expiration of the law. We argued that
such a temporary reduction in the dividend tax rate induces mature ﬁrms to make large payouts while dividend taxes are low and
can have strongly negative effects on aggregate investment.
While many of the proponents of tax cuts argued that the 2003 and 2006 cuts would increase investment and growth, our
analysis suggests that the cumulative effect of these measures might actually be to reduce aggregate investment because of the
distortions introduced by tax arbitrage in the periods after the tax cuts are expected to expire. Future empirical work should
therefore examine how ﬁrm investment responds in the periods surrounding anticipated dividend tax changes, especially among
mature ﬁrms that have the greatest ability to engage in intertemporal tax arbitrage.
We also found that uncertainty about whether or how long a government will keep a low dividend tax rate in place can lead to a
phenomenon similar to the peso problem: ﬁrms assign a certain probability to a dividend tax increase, which leads them to pay out
more cash than optimal in every period until the uncertainty is resolved. In such a situation, it could be optimal to bring the tax
increase forward — this would immediately increase aggregate investment. Incumbent governments can only control what they
do: they cannot control what the opposition promises, or what ﬁrms and investors believe the opposition might do. Our analysis
suggests that governments that ignore these dynamic effects do so at their peril.
This paper has explored an important set of dynamic interactions. These are pervasive inmany other arenas of policy. Our paper
thus has broader implications for the conduct of policy analysis and political economy in contestable democracies. The question
should not be, what is the best “permanent” policy, but rather, given the policy preferences of the opposition, and the responses of
agents within the economy, what is the best policy each party can pursue when it is in ofﬁce; and what kind of deals can be struck
between different parties to achieve efﬁcient cooperative outcomes.
Appendix A. Model of managerial myopia
The model presented in Section 2 of this paper emphasizes that there are agency problems between the owners and managers
of ﬁrms. We assumed that as a result, ﬁrm managers maximize the expected discounted value of future dividend ﬂows using a
discount rate that includes a premium reﬂecting these agency factors, i.e. that managers of ﬁrms are myopic. This appendix
illustrates how such a discrepancy in discount rates can be motivated.
We assume that there are informational asymmetries between shareholders andmanagers, and as a result a manager's effort is
not perfectly observable to shareholders. In order tomotivate managers to exert effort in such an environment, their compensation
needs to be performance-based, as discussed by e.g. Baker et al. (1988). To capture the effects of incentive paywe follow Chetty and
Saez (2007) in assuming that managers hold a fraction α of their company's stock. However, managers do not serve in their job
forever. For simplicity, we assume that they face an exogenous separation probability s every period, and that they no longer
participate in the company's earnings and dividends after their departure.33 As a result, managers discount dividend payments
every period by a factor of 1−s1þr. Their objective function is therefore33 In a
short-te







1 − τð ÞDt
( )
ting β ¼ 1 − s we can see that this maximization problem is isomorphic to our main model in Eq. (3).Deno 1þr
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